Separation

Status Statement Tags
CPA PKE, Quantumly Broken
The first item in the source’s Open Problems section. It builds counterexamples for PRFs, CPA-secure symmetric-key encryption, MACs, signatures and CCA-2-secure public-key encryption, all classically secure under LWE via black-box reductions and all quantumly broken with two or three classical queries. CPA-secure public-key encryption is the case its technique cannot reach, and it says why. 4 open
Black Box SeparationsLearning With ErrorsQuantum Cryptographyseparation
Four-party NIKE, quadratic, Maurer’s model
Open. Achieved in Shoup’s generic group model by the source paper (Construction 9, Theorem 10); in Maurer’s model the paper’s own O(n^2) attack sets a ceiling that a construction would meet exactly, and nothing is known about reaching it. 5 open
Generic Group ModelNon Interactive Key Exchangeggmseparation
1+1 adaptively secure lattice threshold signature
Resolved. Oriole (Jiang, Wee, Zhu, ePrint 2026/793, posted April 2026, a month after Tweed) gives a lattice-based threshold signature with exactly this shape – two rounds, only the second message-dependent, adaptive security against T-1 corruptions with no erasures, from MSIS and MLWE in the ROM – verified here directly against the paper’s PDF (Definition of adp-TS-sUF-4 in its Figure 4, and the Theorem 2 + Theorem 3 reduction chain to MSIS), not just its abstract. The proof is human-written and published, but not yet independently re-verified line-by-line by this site, nor formalized in Lean.
Learning With ErrorsThreshold SignaturesTight Reductionsromseparationresearch-solved
SBP Collision Resistance
Posed as a displayed Open Question and called a central open challenge. The source gives an efficient online collision finder for small kappa and an overlap-gap-based online lower bound for a different, randomized activation – introduced precisely because the SBP’s own collision space resists a first-moment analysis. For very large kappa collisions become trivial. The middle window is reached by neither technique. 4 open
Average Case HardnessCollision Resistant HashingOverlap Gap PropertyPlanted Constraint Satisfactionseparation
Conflict Checkable Codes Beyond Half-Singleton
Theorem 1.8 proves k <= (n-d+2)/2 for codes that are both comparison-based and local-to-global consistent. Theorem 1.3 gives an almost-MDS conflict checkable code at k >= n-d+1-epsilon which bypasses that bound, but it is neither comparison-based nor known to be local-to-global consistent. The conjecture names comparison-basedness as the culprit. It already holds at d = n-1. 4 open
Code Based CryptographyLocally Testable CodesThreshold Secret Sharingseparationadaptation (ai)
Erasing real-or-random vs Boneh–Zhandry
Open: whether erasing real-or-random security implies Boneh-Zhandry security. The reverse non-implication is proved only in the quantum random oracle model, and this direction is one of six non-implications the source paper conjectures and does not prove. 5 open
Quantum CryptographyQuantum Encryption Notionsseparation
No key agreement from GC-OWF
Open for round complexity growing with the security parameter. Proved in full for two messages, which is public-key encryption; the constant-round extension is sketched in the paper’s appendix without a theorem, its security half deferred to the PKE proof. 5 open
Black Box SeparationsGarbled CircuitsKey Agreementotherseparationadaptation (ai)
One erasing challenge vs many embedding learns
Open: whether a single erasing two-ciphertext challenge query, with classical learning queries, implies security against polynomially many embedding-model superposition learning queries. One of six non-implications the source paper conjectures, and on its own account the one that would close the most remaining cells. 5 open
Quantum CryptographyQuantum Encryption Notionsseparation
Standard real-or-random vs embedding two-ciphertext
Open: whether one standard-oracle real-or-random challenge query implies one embedding-model two-ciphertext challenge query, with classical learning queries on both sides. Both notions are singleton classes in the source’s classification, and this is one of six non-implications it conjectures. 5 open
Quantum CryptographyQuantum Encryption Notionsseparation
OWFs are black-box helpful for CRHFs
Open in both directions. Two relaxations — distributional and class-reduction helpfulness — are proved conditional on the Simon-oracle amplification conjecture; neither yields the universal auxiliary primitive the full statement needs. 4 open
Black Box SeparationsCollision Resistant HashingOne Way Functionsotherseparation
PKE from constant-noise planted k-XOR
Open: whether public-key encryption can be based on the hardness of planted k-XOR with a linear number of equations and a constant noise rate, as a single assumption. The survey poses it as one of two closing open questions and does not return to it; every combinatorial scheme it surveys needs sub-constant noise.
Average Case HardnessPlanted Constraint Satisfactionseparationbarrier (ai)
Certifying no small non-expanding set
Open: whether the non-existence of a small non-expanding set in a random unbalanced bipartite graph admits a nondeterministic certificate that is sound and complete on average, at the parameters the ABW cryptosystem uses. The survey poses it as one of two closing open questions, takes no position, and does not return to it.
Average Case HardnessExpander Graphsseparation
XOR as a Weak 2-Immunizer
The single unresolved cell in the source’s own table: XOR fails as a strong 2-immunizer under Alekhnovich, a bilinear pairing fails as a weak one under SXDH, a random oracle succeeds even with auxiliary input. The weak case for XOR is left open with a conjectured answer and a concrete route to it. 4 open
Backdoored PrimitivesBlack Box SeparationsPseudorandom Generatorsseparationadaptation (ai)
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