Tag: IOG
Statements carrying tags: [iog] — those whose cited sources include an author affiliated with Input Output Research.
What the tag claims, and what it does not. It records that somebody on the author list of a cited paper is affiliated with Input Output. It does not say the paper was published, funded or endorsed by them, and it says nothing at all about the statement itself, which is this site’s own formalization of an open question the paper left. Where the two come apart — a paper by an IO-affiliated author that IO’s own publication list does not carry — the tag is still correct, because it is about the author.
This is a provenance tag rather than a subject one: it sits alongside the model, form and category chips rather than among the 19 areas, which say what a statement is about.
| Status | Statement | Tags |
|---|---|---|
|
Dream DPT for a moderately hard function Open: whether there exists a function family, and a standard fine-grained hardness hypothesis (the paper suggests NSETH as an example), for which solving t independent instances requires resources within a subexponentially small factor of solving them one at a time, with no loss in the exponent. The source reduces its permissionless consensus protocol to exactly this statement and leaves it unconstructed. 5 open |
standardassumptionresearch-opennew-idea (ai)IOG | |
|
Partial-PKI consensus up to one-half resilience Open: whether consensus is achievable at every resilience gamma < 1/2 in the paper’s permissionless common-random-string setting, by some protocol using any means of bootstrapping party identities. The source proves resilience up to 1/4(1-3*epsilon) via a specific protocol and proves 1/4 is tight only for the restricted class of protocols that sign everything they send and verify everything they receive; the gap to the classical 1/2 ceiling is open for arbitrary protocols. 5 open |
standardtight-boundresearch-opennew-idea (ai)IOG | |
|
Threshold one-shot decryption without extractability Open: whether threshold one-shot decryption (for every corruption threshold f < 1/2) follows from one-shot signatures and an ordinary, non-extractable witness encryption scheme. The one known construction needs the witness-encryption extractor to run its security reduction, and the source paper leaves open whether extractability can be weakened or dropped altogether. 5 open |
standardassumptionresearch-opennew-idea (ai)IOG |